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The use of the revelation principle has become widespread in the optimal contracts literature,1 in
large part because of the convenient description it provides of the set of allocations which can be
achieved when information is decentralized. Unfortunately, when contracting situations become
more complex, the applicability and usefulness of the revelation principle comes into question.2
In this note, we brieﬂy address three questions which arise in the context of common agency
games: (i) What is the set of allocations which are implementable as equilibria of games among
competing mechanism designers for some exogenously given communication spaces and can this set
be easily described? (ii) How does this set compare to truthful equilibrium allocations of the direct
communication game in which agents report only their physical types? Is the revelation principle
still valid under decentralized contracting? And ﬁnally, (iii), can alternative approaches such as
the extended-taxation (or delegation) principle be usefully applied?
One approach to this multi-principal implementation problem has been pioneered by Epstein
and Peters (1999) who, in multi-principal-multi-agent games, demonstrate the existence of a uni-
versal message space for which the revelation principle is valid. Such a message space, in particular,
must include a suﬃciently rich language to incorporate the agent’s underlying type and the market
information (e.g., other principals’ contracts). Of course, as McAfee (1993) and others have noted,
there is a potential problem of inﬁnite regress as each principal needs to enlarge the agent’s type
space to include messages about the other principal’s contract oﬀer. The remarkable contribution of
Epstein and Peters (1999) is to show that such a sequence of enlargements converges to a universal
type space. With such a type space, the revelation principle can be reinstated. Unfortunately, in
practice it is quite diﬃcult to characterize the universal type space for applications. We see the
contribution of this note as providing a more practical alternative in the context of common agency
games.
Our idea is to employ the “taxation principle” developed by Guesnerie (1981, 1995) and Rochet
(1986). This principle holds that for any truth-telling, direct-revelation mechanism, there exists an
associated schedule or menu of choices which can be oﬀered to the agent and which implements
the same equilibrium outcome through decentralization.3 The extension of the taxation principle
which we employ (what we will hereafter refer to as the “delegation principle” given the more gen-
eral context) is essentially the reverse of the revelation principle. Take any indirect communication
mechanism and replace it with the decentralized menus of payoﬀ-relevant contracting choices as
1The revelation principle has been stated by many researchers, including Gibbard (1973), Green and Laﬀont
(1977), Dasgupta et al. (1979), Myerson (1979,1982), and Harris and Townsend (1981).
2Green and Laﬀont (1986) already discuss the applicability of the revelation principle in the single-principal
environment when the set of messages available to the agent is type-dependent.
3Peters (1999) has recently provided a similar suggestion in order to bypass universal message spaces. His work is
independent to our own and focuses on various notions of equilibrium robustness as one varies the mechanism space.
Peters’ Theorems 1 and 2 are closely related to our Theorem 1 and corollary, although the setting Peters explores
includes hidden actions in addition to hidden information.
1suggested by the original taxation principle. Providing that any size restrictions on the original
message spaces are translated into corresponding restrictions on the spaces of decentralized menus,
we show that the original equilibrium outcome remains an equilibrium in the new menu game. In
this sense, when studying equilibria in multi-principal settings, it is without loss of generality to
restrict attention to strategy spaces of decentralized menus of contracting variables. Because the
traditional revelation principle is still available to a principal when determining best responses to
a rival’s conjectured strategy, care needs only to be taken to include important out-of-equilibrium
menu oﬀers when constructing equilibria in this menu game. In particular, if interest is restricted
to the set of pure-strategy, deterministic communication equilibria, then the best-response cor-
respondences are straightforward to calculate (just as in any single principal-agent setting), and
Nash equilibria are found in the standard manner. The construction of universal message spaces is
thereby avoided.
In section 2, after we set up our notation for common agency games, we provide three basic
reasons for a failure of the revelation principle, including a speciﬁc example for what we believe is
the most economically signiﬁcant failure – the presence of out-of-equilibrium messages. In section
3, we develop the delegation principle by extending the taxation principle to multi-principal games,
and in section 4 we apply it to a few illustrative examples.
2 A Framework for Simple Common Agency Games
Consider a game with N principals, for i = 1,...,N, and a single agent. Each principal can
contract with the agent over an allocation di ∈ Di, where Di is ﬁnite. In a sense to be made
precise, each principal’s strategy space is the space of communication mechanisms deﬁned over
Di; the agent’s strategy space consists of mappings from messages into choices available to the
agent in each contract. It is important to note that principal i cannot contract over the set of
allocations controlled by principal j. Let D ≡
QN
i=1 Di and d ≡ (d1,...,dN) ∈ D be the vector-
space representation of contract actions.4 The agent has a type drawn from a ﬁnite set, θ ∈ Θ,
which is private information but whose probability distribution, f(θ), is common knowledge. The
agent’s vNM utility is given by U(d,θ) and each principal’s utility is given by V i(d,θ); the latter’s
preferences allow for a dependence upon the contract actions of the other principals.5
We are interested in communication mechanisms (or contracts), which are functions from mes-
sages to probability measures over allocations controlled by each principal. Let Mi be a mea-










j. It is worth noting that one could easily extend our analysis to
consider issues of moral hazard or “obedience” in the sense of Myerson (1982) by appending an additional vector of
imperfectly observable actions over which the principals make suggestions. The treatment of Peters (2000) is more
general in this regard.
5The general case of direct payoﬀ externalities among principals in common agency settings is examined in Mar-
timort and Stole (1998).
2surable message space available to principal i and denote individual messages as mi ∈ Mi. Let
M ≡
QN
i=1 Mi and m ≡ (m1,...,mN) ∈ M. Formally, a communication mechanism for prin-
cipal i, πi(di|mi), is a measurable mapping from messages to distributions over actions; i.e.,
πi : Mi → ∆(Di).6 We represent the set of mechanisms as Πi = (∆(Di))Mi
, assumed to be
measurable. The corresponding product of these sets is denoted by Π ≡
QN
i=1 Πi. Because the
space of communication mechanisms, Πi, depends fundamentally on the richness of the underlying
message space, Mi, which is of central interest in this note, we will often make this dependence
explicit: Πi(Mi). For the speciﬁc setting in which the communication mechanism is a degenerate
probability distribution on Di for every message, we say that the mechanism is deterministic.
Throughout this analysis, we take all of the primitives of our communication game as ﬁxed,
except for the message space, M, which can be either ﬁnite or inﬁnite. As a consequence, we will
associate a common agency communication game, ΓM, with its message space. The timing of ΓM
is as follows. First, the agent draws its type from the distribution f(θ) on Θ. Second, each of
the N principals simultaneously oﬀers a contract, πi ∈ Πi(Mi), to the agent. Third, the agent
chooses a vector of messages, m, reporting the i-th component to principal i (and only to principal
i). For our purposes, we suppress the participation decision of the agent, in eﬀect assuming that
participation is required.7 Payoﬀs are awarded according to the contracts π and messages m, using
public randomizing devices as necessary to generate each πi. Each principal i chooses a strategy
σi(πi) ∈ ∆(Πi), which is a probability distribution over Πi and the agent’s strategy is a mapping
from type-contract space onto a distribution of messages; σ0 : Θ × Π → ∆(M), where we will
represent the agent’s conditional probability distribution over messages for each given (θ,π) by
σ0(m|θ,π). A strategy proﬁle is represented as σ = (σ0,...,σN). We denote by suppσ0(θ,π)
the support of this strategy, i.e., the set of messages which are sent with a positive probability,
σ0(m|θ,π) > 0, when the agent has type θ, has received the collective mechanism, π, and follows
the strategy σ0. A similar notation applies to suppσi. We consider Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
(PBE) of ΓM.8
Deﬁnition 1 : A strategy proﬁle σ∗ is an equilibrium of ΓM (i.e., σ∗ ∈ PBE(ΓM)) iﬀ
6Throughout, whenever characterizing probability distributions, we will use the ﬁrst argument as an element of
the support and any other arguments as conditionals; in an abuse of notation, we will also occasionally treat the
distribution function as a vector, such as π
i(·|m) ∈ ∆(D
i). It should be understood that a communication mechanism
is only fully deﬁned given a speciﬁc message space. When there is possible ambiguity about the associated message
space, we will refer to the pair {π
i,M
i} for preciseness.
7Depending upon the nature of the game, we could model the agent’s participation decision more generally by
either requiring all principals to include a null contract in their oﬀer, or by allowing the agent to reject the contract
oﬀers and walk away. In addition, we could allow the agent the option of either signing with all the principals or
none of them (the case of intrinsic common agency) which may be appropriate in a regulatory context, or the option
to sign with any subset of principals (the case of delegated common agency).
8To give any meaning to our analysis, we will assume that there exists such an equilibrium.
3(a). ∀ θ ∈ Θ, ∀ π ∈ Π(M) :
m ∈ suppσ∗








(b). ∀ i : πi ∈ suppσ∗
i =⇒
















In short, a strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium if (a) the agent only places positive weight on mes-
sages which are weakly optimal for any given set of oﬀered contracts, and (b) principals only choose
contracts with positive probability if the contracts are weakly optimal given the agent’s communi-
cation strategy. We use the term pure-strategy communication equilibrium to mean a collection of
pure-strategies {m(θ,π),π1,...,πN} which are jointly optimal. A pure-strategy equilibrium may
still involve random (non-deterministic) mechanisms: πi ∈ int∆(Di). For any strategy proﬁle σ, we
denote the equilibrium probability distribution over D for each θ ∈ Θ by µσ(d|θ). We refer to µσ as
the allocation induced by the strategy proﬁle σ. For reference as a benchmark, a direct revelation
communication game is a game in which each principal’s message space is restricted to be the type
space of the agent: Mi ≡ Θ and M ≡ ΘN. We denote such a speciﬁc communication game by
ΓΘN.
With this notation in hand, one is tempted to posit the revelation principle in its simplest (but
incorrect) form: for each σ∗ ∈ PBE(ΓM), there exists ˜ σ∗ ∈ PBE(ΓΘN) such that (i) µσ∗(d|θ) ≡
µ˜ σ∗(d|θ), ∀ (d,θ), and (ii) ˜ σ∗
0(θ|θ,π) = 1, ∀ θ ∈ Θ,∀ πi such that ˜ σ∗
i(πi) > 0. In words, for any
equilibrium σ∗ of some communication game ΓM, there exists an equilibrium ˜ σ∗ of the direct-
revelation communication game ΓΘN which (i) gives rise to the same distribution over D as σ∗ and
(ii) has truth-telling as an equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
3 Diﬃculties with the Revelation Principle
In the standard proof of the revelation principle for the canonical principal-agent setting, one
shows that the principal can prune any choices in the original game that are never chosen on
the equilibrium path and restrict attention to the remaining set. Since the mapping from agent
types into the pruned strategy set is surjective, the principal can index strategy choices by the
agent’s type, forming a direct mechanism. In the new direct game, the agent “reports” his type,
thereby choosing the strategy which was optimal in the original indirect game. In the context of
multi-principal games, this proof fails on three fronts.
First, when there are two or more principals, the agent may serve a new role as a correlating
device in the indirect communication game. This role cannot be preserved in the direct commu-
4nication game unless an appropriate randomizing device is appended to the agent’s physical type
space. This is a minor diﬃculty which can easily be addressed. The two remaining diﬃculties are
more problematic.
Second, in the canonical principal-agent setting, the agent has no reason to be untruthful in
the principal’s direct mechanism when asked about his private information; it is assumed that the
agent tells the truth to the principal when indiﬀerent. In a multi-principal setting one principal
may prefer to induce the agent to “lie” to the other principal, with the result that truthful equilibria
may fail to exist in non-pathological market games. This nonexistence of truth-telling equilibria in
multi-principal, exclusive-agent games was ﬁrst demonstrated in an example by Myerson (1982),
although the implications for the revelation principle were not explicitly noted. In a previous version
of this note, Martimort and Stole (1993), we provided a related counterexample in the context of
common agency. A similar insight is also present in the exclusive agency game of Peck (1996), who
independently arrived at related conclusions regarding the possibility that some mixed-strategy
equilibria may not be truthfully implementable in direct mechanisms.
A third diﬃculty is that pruning out-of-equilibrium messages may destroy the associated equi-
librium in the original game because the out-of-equilibrium messages may have critical strategic
eﬀects vis-` a-vis the other principals. In a direct revelation game, such messages are not used (by
deﬁnition). We ﬁnd this failure more prevalent in our own research on common agency games
because in many market, regulatory and political situations it may be important that nonlinear
schedules be extended beyond equilibrium choices.9 In such settings, restricting attention to truth-
ful equilibria in direct revelation communication games may eliminate some equilibria which were
sustained by out-of-equilibrium messages and may (perhaps simultaneously) introduce other equi-
libria which could not be sustained in the indirect mechanisms. The essence of the problem is that
the agent’s strategy is no longer only a mapping from the agent’s physical type space to the agents
choice set; now the agent’s choice from principal i’s oﬀer depends upon principal j’s oﬀer. An
indexation can only be accomplished if the index includes the market information (i.e., contracts
oﬀered by other principals) as well as types. This is the idea of the universal message space of
Epstein and Peters (1999).
To illustrate this third failure more clearly, consider the simplest possible case where an agent’s
type is degenerate, |Θ| = 1, thereby eliminating adverse selection issues for the moment. Initially,
we also restrict each principal’s strategy spaces to deterministic contracts; that is, we assume con-
tracts cannot assign lotteries over actions10, even though principals may choose mixed strategies
over the space of deterministic contracts. Consider a speciﬁc setting where each principal’s contract
space is Di ≡ {A,B,C} and the payoﬀs to the three parties are represented as triplets, {V 1,V 2,U},
given in the payoﬀ matrix in Figure 1.
9See, for example, Stole (1991), Martimort (1992, 1996), and Martimort and Stole (1998).
10In practice such randomizations may be diﬃcult to verify by a third-party or court of law.
5Figure 1: Payoﬀs for a Simple Common-Agency Game:
d2=A d2=B d2=C
d1=A 1,1,1 2,0,2 -1,5,10
d1=B 0,2,2 1,1,1 0,0,0
d1=C 5,-1,10 0,0,0 0,0,0
It is useful to ﬁrst consider a common agency menu-delegation game without explicit commu-
nication in which each principal can oﬀer the agent any subset of Di from which to choose; i.e., the
principals oﬀer the agent a menu of contract decisions from which to select and there is no direct
communication. Note that in this delegation game, each principal i can only restrict the agent’s
choice over Di. In this simple example, the following contract oﬀers form a perfect Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium: Each principal oﬀers the menu {B,C}, from which the agent chooses di = B. The
resulting allocation yields a payoﬀ vector of {1,1,1}. Note that C is oﬀered by principal 1 as an
oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path choice for the agent to discourage principal 2 from oﬀering A. If principal
1 were to oﬀer only {B} to the agent, principal 2’s best response would be to oﬀer {A}. When
principal 1 oﬀers {B,C} in equilibrium, principal 2 will not oﬀer A as then the agent would choose
C from principal 1, yielding a payoﬀ of −1 to principal 2; rather, it is a best response for principal
2 to oﬀer {B,C} as well, obtaining the payoﬀ of +1.
Not surprisingly, any outcome of the menu-delegation game can be supported in an indirect
communication mechanism game if the message space contains two messages because the principal
can commit to choose from a subset of allowable actions according to the agent’s request. For
example, the equilibrium outcome of {B,B} from the delegation game can be implemented as
a perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the indirect common agency communication game with
a two-message space, Mi ≡ {mi
b,mi
c}. The contract oﬀers of πi(B|mi
b) = 1 and πi(C|mi
c) = 1
by each principal characterizes a PBE in the communication game in which the agent reports
m = {m1
b,m2
b} and the equilibrium allocation is {B,B}. It is also worth noting at this point that
{C,C} is an equilibrium outcome of the common agency game for any message spaces. Speciﬁcally,
each principal implementing C regardless of messages from the agent is an equilibrium. Thus, the
implementable set of outcomes within indirect common agency games with suﬃciently rich message
spaces includes {B,B} and {C,C}.
Can the same equilibrium allocations {B,B} and {C,C} be implemented as equilibria in a direct
6mechanism communication game (i.e., where the message space is degenerate)? With only direct
communication from the agent, each principal is restricted to choosing (perhaps randomly) a single
di ∈ Di to implement; there is no strategic role for the agent. Of the two outcomes above, only
{C,C} is truthfully implementable in the direct-mechanism communication game. Remarkably, the
outcome {B,B} cannot be implemented. The equilibrium outcome {B,B} is unavailable in the
direct revelation communication game because without eﬀective communication between principal i
and the agent, principal j will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate to action A. With eﬀective communication
between principal i and the agent, {B,B} can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome by allowing
principal j’s deviation to A to be communicated by the agent to principal i, resulting in choice C.
This example already suggests that enlarging the principals’ strategy spaces and letting them
oﬀer any subset of the set of decisions they respectively control plays an important role in the
description of the equilibrium set of a common agency game. Given the failure of direct-revelation
communication games to replicate the equilibrium set of a communication game using ﬁxed message
spaces of a given complexity, we may instead look for a natural strategy space for the principals
with the property that restricting those principals to oﬀer subsets of this strategy space with a
given complexity allows to replicate the outcome of any communication game. This is precisely the
purpose of the delegation principle that we propose below.
4 The Delegation Principle
We present a simple delegation principle for common agency games: the set of equilibrium outcomes
obtainable in an indirect communication game with arbitrary message spaces can be replicated as
equilibrium outcomes in a game in which the principals oﬀer payoﬀ relevant menus from which the
agent chooses. With this principle, we can apply further simpliﬁcations to ﬁnding equilibria in the
delegation game: (i) we can prune strategically dominated strategies and, (ii) use the revelation
principle to calculate each principal’s best response function. In many instances we can characterize
the set of equilibria in a manner which is currently diﬃcult using universal message spaces, since
the latter approach is not amenable to optimization with simple incentive constraints.
The taxation principle in the one-principal context holds that any deterministic direct communi-
cation mechanism can be decentralized as a nonlinear tariﬀ (or tax) by substitution. For example,
in the context of nonlinear pricing by a monopolist facing a consumer with a one-dimensional
private characteristic, the deterministic, direct communication mechanism {p(θ),q(θ)}θ∈Θ can be
converted into the indirect nonlinear price, P(q), by inverting the quantity function, q(θ), and
substituting into the price function, p(θ): i.e., P(q) ≡ p(θ−1(q)). The taxation principle says that
for any direct communication mechanism, there exists a nonlinear schedule which implements the
same outcome. Hence, in applied work, the principal can use the revelation principle to justify
optimizing over the set of truthful direct mechanisms, and then, upon ﬁnding an optimum, she can
7apply the taxation principle to convert the optimum into a more common contracting form. The
insight of the taxation principle easily extends to random mechanisms, in which case the principal
oﬀers a menu of lotteries.
The intuition of devising a similar principle for multi-principal settings is particularly inviting
in the context of common agency games: fundamentally, the agent and principals only care about
communication insofar as it aﬀects the ﬁnal distribution over payoﬀ-relevant variables. This is the
basic motivation of the delegation principle in common agency games. Hence, while the revelation
principle with simple type spaces is no longer available, the delegation principle still aﬀords us some
reduction in the complexity of the problem.
Consider a communication mechanism and a given message space, {πi,Mi}, for principal i. As
the message mi varies within Mi, the mapping πi(·|mi) traces out a whole subset of payoﬀ-relevant
distributions over the action set, Di. We denote by πi(·|Mi) the image of this mapping over the
message space, Mi. πi(·|Mi) is thus simply a subset – or “menu” – of distributions over actions.
Of course, the size of this menu space depends upon any restrictions on communication. As an
example, if Mi = {mi}, then no meaningful communication is possible and πi(·|Mi) consists of





then πi(·|Mi) consists of (at most) two probability distributions over Di. More generally, πi(·|Mi)
is a subset of ∆(Di), whose cardinality is no greater than the available communication space Mi
because πi(·|mi) is injective.
We say that an arbitrary menu of distributions, Ti, is consistent with a message space Mi if
there exists a mechanism πi deﬁned on Mi such that Ti = πi(·|Mi). The set of all such menus
consistent with Mi is given by T i(Mi).11 Formally,
T i(Mi) ≡ {πi(·|Mi)|πi ∈ Πi(Mi)}.
In words, T i(Mi) is the set of all subsets of ∆(Di) having cardinality at most that of Mi. T i(Mi)
can thus be viewed as the set of possible menus that principal i can oﬀer when the communication
space is Mi.12 We deﬁne π(·|M), π−i(·|M−i), T (M), and T −i(M−i) as the relevant products of
these menus and sets of menus taken in the obvious way.
It is worth noting that while for any communication mechanism and message space, {πi,Mi},
the menu πi(·|,Mi) is uniquely deﬁned, this mapping is not one-to-one because many distinct
communication mechanisms give rise to the same set of lotteries over actions. As a simple example,
any permutation of the message-lottery assignments will generate a distinct mechanism with an
identical set of distributions. To take a more prosaic example, the physical nature of the contract
11We will use T
i to denote an arbitrary element of T
i(M
i).
12Note that if T
i(M
i) were deﬁned instead to allow for redundant menu items, then the set of menus would
have the same dimensions as Π
i(M
i). Because such redundancy has been pruned in the construction of the menu
space, the principal’s strategy space in the delegation game is less rich compared to the strategy space in the original
communication mechanism game.
8(i.e., the lotteries it generates) may be the same regardless of whether the contract communication
takes place in English, in French, or if delegation is used and no words are spoken. As such,
the physical set of lotteries that a contract allows forms an equivalence class across the universe
of possible modes of communication: i.e., two distinct communication mechanisms and message
spaces, {πi,Mi} and {πi0,Mi0}, belong to the same equivalence class if and only if their respective
images are identical; i.e., πi(·|,Mi) = πi0
(·|,Mi0
).
The idea of the delegation principle is that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to
delegation games in which each principal’s strategy space is coarsened to choices among the original
equivalence classes, and the agent is allowed to choose which probability distribution to implement
from the subset of oﬀered equivalence classes. If true, this implies that the exact speciﬁcation of
the underlying communication spaces only matters to the extent that it aﬀects the set of available
equivalence classes from which the principal chooses. Moreover, because Ti is a subset of ∆(Di), one
can begin to see the appeal of the delegation principle: For a contracting game between principals
who have access to very rich message spaces for communication with the agent, the associated
delegation game has strategies which are mixtures over subsets of ∆(Di).13
To deﬁne and prove the general version of the delegation principle for common agency games,
we need to deﬁne an equilibrium for our menu game, Γd
T (M). In this game, principal i’s strategy is
represented as ˜ σi(Ti), a mixed strategy over the space of menu oﬀers T i(Mi); the agent’s strategy
is a measure, ˜ σ0(τ|θ,T), deﬁned over selections, τ ∈ T, from each possible menu, T. We deﬁne
supp ˜ σ0(θ,T) as the subset of oﬀered distributions which are chosen with positive probability by
an agent with type θ when facing the collective menu of distributions, T, from the principals.
A similar deﬁnition applies to supp ˜ σi, which is the subset of menus from T i(Mi) chosen with
positive probability by each principal i. A perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the delegation
game is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 : A strategy proﬁle ˜ σ∗ is an equilibrium of ΓT (M) (i.e., ˜ σ∗ ∈ PBE(ΓT (M))) if and
only if
(a). ∀ θ ∈ Θ :
τ ∈ supp ˜ σ∗





(b). ∀ i : Ti ∈ supp ˜ σ∗
i =⇒
















13To be precise, the selection has cardinality no greater than what is available in the underlying communication
space.
9Deﬁning the equilibrium distribution over D as µ˜ σ∗(d|θ), the Delegation Principle can be stated
succinctly.
Theorem 1 : (Delegation Principle for Common Agency Games) For each σ∗ ∈ PBE(ΓM),
∃ ˜ σ∗ ∈ PBE(Γd
T (M)) such that µσ∗(d|θ) ≡ µ˜ σ∗(d|θ).
The complete proof is presented in the Appendix. There are a few technical diﬃculties involved
in proving the delegation principle for common agency games, the most notable is that the choice of
language (e.g., English or French in our example) may itself play a strategic role in the equilibrium
of the indirect game, such as a randomization device for the agent. Any such role, however, can
be maintained by allowing the agent to perform the randomization directly, thereby implementing
the same distribution over actions as in the original equilibrium of the indirect game.
The Delegation Principle argues that focusing on communication per se is unnecessary to charac-
terize the set of equilibrium allocations in communication games. All that matters is the restriction,
embodied in T (M), that the size of the underlying communication spaces imposes. Whatever the
initial constraints on communication imposed by each Mi, there exist constraints on the sets of
payoﬀ relevant probability measures over actions which can be oﬀered such that, within this con-
strained set, each principal ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀer a menu of such probability measures, letting
the agent choose within those menus, and the resulting equilibrium allocation is the same as in the
original communication game. This last point which is worth stressing: explicit communication
between each principal and the agent is unnecessary.
5 Applications of the Delegation Principle
The extension of the delegation principle to common agency games provides the equivalence between
equilibria in any given communication game for some given message space and the equilibria in an
appropriately chosen menu game. Where the delegation principle has perhaps the greatest value,
however, is precisely in those situations in which the underlying message space of the indirect game
is very rich. Arguably, each principal should be able to choose larger message spaces if such a
deviation is proﬁtable. In a game with such unrestricted communication, the strategy space for
a principal should be any communication space, Mi, and a mixture σi over probability measures
πi(·|·) which map Mi into ∆(Di). In this setting, it is diﬃcult to characterize the set of all equilibria
because it is hard to imagine the set of all mechanisms available in any deviation. The Delegation
Principle says that it is enough to consider the class of unrestricted menu games.
For any message space Mi, the set T (Mi) remains a subset of ∆(Di). Hence as the complexity
of Mi increases,14 the cardinality of T (Mi) cannot be greater than the cardinality of the power
14M
i0
is more complex than M
i if there exists an injective mapping from M
i into M
i0
but not the reverse.
10set of ∆(Di). This casts an upper bound on the complexity of the communication space useful
to describe the equilibrium of common agency games when the principals face no constraints in
designing their mechanisms. This communication space need not be more complex than ∆(Di).
Corollary 1 : Any equilibrium outcome of a communication game with unrestricted communica-
tion is an equilibrium outcome in the associated payoﬀ-relevant menu game in which menus are
unrestricted; i.e., each principal can oﬀer any arbitrary subset Ti of ∆(Di).
Hence, an economist interested in the set of equilibria to an unrestricted communication game
needs only investigate the set of equilibria in the decentralized menu game.15 This characterization,
while useful in showing how large the strategy spaces of the principals can be, is in general less
useful in describing possible equilibrium allocations. Nevertheless, a few structured examples are
useful to see the applicability of this corollary.
2 A Simple Example: Consider the following game between two principals and an agent who
has type θ ∈ {−1,+1}, which is drawn with equal probability. Each principal has a set of two
allocations from which to choose: Di ≡ {di
A,di
B} with di
A = 0 and di
B = 1. The utility of the
agent over D × Θ is U = θ(d1 + d2); the utility of principal 1 is V 1 = θ(d1 − d2) and the utility of
principal 2 is the reverse, V 2 = θ(d2 − d1). Hence, we have a very simple zero-sum game (between
the principals) which can be thought of as a metaphor for product market competition between
two wholesalers with a common retailer (agent), where θ represents the demand state. When the
demand state θ is high, the agent prefers to implement the high actions for both principals; when
the demand state is low, the agent prefers the low actions. Each principal prefers that the agent
implement her own high action iﬀ the state of demand is high, while each principal prefers the
agent to take an action with respect to the other principal that is unproﬁtable for that principal.
Consider the case in which the indirect mechanism is a mapping from arbitrarily rich message
space into the one-dimensional simplex. An associated menu is then a subset of the unit interval
and the space of menus is the power set of [0,1]. In the present case, we can now solve for the
entire set of equilibrium outcomes in this indirect mechanism game. Because the structure of a
pure-strategy menu oﬀer from principal i is a (possibly inﬁnite) collection of intervals of [0,1],
the joint oﬀer received by the agent, T = {T1,T2}, can be represented as a collection of disjoint
rectangles in [0,1]2. Given the agent’s bilinear preferences, the θ = +1 (resp., θ = −1) agent
will always choose the northeast (resp., southwest) corner of the most extreme northeast (resp.,
southwest) rectangle of T ⊂ [0,1]2. Because the equilibrium of the original indirect game must
15This is essentially Peters’ (2000) idea of weak robustness presented in his Theorem 2. One could explore a
stronger notion of robustness as in Peters (2000) and require that the addition of messages to a menu game not
induce a diﬀerent equilibrium outcome. If it is possible that the addition of messages allows a principal to change the
equilibrium play to an alternative equilibrium, and if one believes that communication is an important determinant of
equilibrium play, our corollary is not satisfactory and an explicit analysis of communication games seems warranted
as noted by Peters (2000). Here, universal message spaces may have a particular appeal.
11have allowed messages which generated a compact range in the neighborhood of the agent’s choice,
we can restrict attention to the closure of these rectangles. Figure 2 illustrates the game’s geometry.
Figure 2: Geometry of the Example
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Consider any contract oﬀer by principal 2. For any such equilibrium oﬀer, principal 1 will
always beneﬁt by increasing the range of her menu oﬀers to include the deterministic choices d1
A
and d1
B. This is because nothing that principal 1 does can aﬀect the agent’s choice over d2, while
the agent and principal 1’s preferences are aligned for the choice over d1. If principal 2 chooses a
mixed strategy over menu oﬀers, principal 1’s best response still includes these extreme choices. An
analogous argument establishes that principal 2 will always oﬀer agent the deterministic choices of
d2
A and d2
B. With these oﬀers, all other oﬀers are irrelevant, and the agent always chooses {d1
A,d2
A}
when θ = −1 and {d1
B,d2
B} when θ = +1. Therefore in all indirect communication equilibria, each
principal makes zero proﬁts and the agent makes an expected payoﬀ of 1. Note that the example
illustrates how techniques such as iterated dominance may be useful in menu-games with simple
structures.
2 An Extended Example:
In previous papers on common agency in adverse selection settings (e.g., Martimort (1992,1996)
and Stole (1991)), the analysis was limited to equilibria in nonlinear pricing games (which may
include out-of-equilibrium oﬀers) without a clear sense of the loss of generality involved in restricting
attention to those strategy spaces. The delegation principle makes clear that this equilibrium
analysis is general.16
16As a recent example, Martimort and Stole (1998) use the delegation principle to explore the set of common
12To see how the delegation principle may be useful in these more complex settings, consider the
setting of a ﬁrm selling to a consumer with a one-dimensional private characteristic, but suppose
now that the consumer buys a diﬀerentiated product from a rival ﬁrm. We consider the space of
all indirect deterministic communication mechanisms.17 A representative element of this space is
πi ≡ {pi(mi),qi(mi)}mi∈Mi, where pi is the price paid for qi quantity of principal i’s good. From
this potentially complex mechanism, we construct the associated set of menus available to the agent
oﬀered πi as
πi(·|Mi) ≡ {(pi,qi) | ∃ mi ∈ Mi s.t. pi = pi(mi), qi = qi(mi)}.
Two mechanisms {πi,Mi} and {πi0,Mi0} are in the same equivalence class when they induce the
same set of price-quantity pairs. In the delegation variation of the game, the principal oﬀers a menu
of (pi,qi) pairs which, if the underlying communication space is unrestricted, can be arbitrarily large.
Because we are interested in the set of equilibria to the original indirect mechanism game, we
can further prune away from the menu-delegation set all dominated strategies without aﬀecting the
equilibrium outcome. In the present context, this allows us to focus attention on all price schedules
deﬁned over a possibly restricted domain of outputs. Correspondences such that diﬀerent messages
yield the same price but diﬀerent outputs or the same output but at diﬀerent prices are easily
ruled out because no dominated price-quantity pairs would ever be chosen by the consumer whose
utility is strictly increasing in quantity and money. Hence, dominated price-quantity pairs cannot
have a strategic eﬀect. Only the lower envelope of oﬀers is relevant in this context. With this
fact in hand, the investigator interested in ﬁnding all pure-strategy, deterministic communication
equilibria with arbitrarily large message spaces can posit a Nash equilibrium in price schedules,
{P1(q1),P2(q2)}, and proceed using the revelation principle to check that the equilibrium choices
of each principal form a best response given the choice of the rival.18 The only diﬃculty which
needs careful attention is with respect to considering all plausible out-of-equilibrium components
of Pi(qi). Provided such out-of-equilibrium extensions are appropriately cared for, the entire set
of deterministic pure-strategy contract equilibria outcomes can be determined by considering this
simpler menu game. In Martimort (1992), the use of out-of-equilibrium actions was accounted
for by allowing each principal to extend her price schedule over out-of-equilibrium choices; this
extension can aﬀect the equilibrium set in the case of economic substitutes in the agent’s utility.
In Stole (1991), the out-of-equilibrium issue was dealt with by making an additional assumption
that underlying preferences are suﬃciently concave; with such an assumption, out-of-equilibrium
price schedules become economically irrelevant. Regardless of how one addresses out-of-equilibrium
oﬀers, a principal can determine her best response to the equilibrium strategy of the other principal
(i.e., a nonlinear price schedule, Pj(qj) deﬁned over a compact set Qj) by considering the following
agency equilibria when contracting externalities are present in the principal’s payoﬀ functions.
17This restriction on the original class of indirect mechanisms, of course, may be with loss of generality.
18Note that this result does not rely on any assumption on the type space. As an illustration, with two possible
types, {θ,θ}, oﬀering a menu {P i(q),P i(q)} is no more useful for the principal than oﬀering a single nonlinear price,
Pi(q) = min{P i(q),P i(q)}.
13indirect utility function:
ˆ U(qi,pi,θ) ≡ max
qj∈Qj U(qi,pi,qj,Pj(qj),θ),
and then applying the standard paradigm of nonlinear pricing as if in a single-principal setting.19
19Note each principal can use the revelation principle when constructing her best response given the oﬀer of the
rival, so the revelation principle retains considerable value. But because ˆ U depends implicitly upon the shape of
Pj(qj), both in and out of equilibrium, ﬁnding a Nash equilibrium in nonlinear prices requires some care to consider
the eﬀect of out-of-equilibrium tariﬀs.
14Appendix
Proof of the Delegation Principle:
The proof proceeds by construction of the equilibrium strategies of the principals and the agent
in the delegation game, {˜ σ∗
i}N
i=0, given their equilibrium strategies in the original communication
game, {σ∗
i }N
i=0, with given message space, M.
First, we construct the principals’ strategies. For this purpose, ﬁxing M we deﬁne Φi(Ti) to be
the subset of communication mechanisms in Πi(Mi) that forms the equivalence class for a given
menu Ti having cardinality at most equal to that of Mi.
Φi(Ti) ≡ {πi ∈ Πi(Mi)| Ti = πi(·|Mi)}.
Implicitly, Φi depends upon Mi as well, but we suppress this for notational simplicity. We deﬁne
Φ−i(T−i) and Φ(T) as the obvious products of these sets. Note that πi ∈ Φi(πi(·|Mi)) ⊆ Πi(Mi)
for all πi ∈ Πi(Mi), but, because two mechanisms πi and πi0 may have the same image, the set








i (πi) is well-deﬁned over Πi(Mi), and because the collection of subsets Φi(Ti) as one
varies Ti ∈ T i(Mi) forms a partition of Πi(Mi) by construction, ˜ σ∗
i(Ti) is well-deﬁned over T i(Mi).
Notably, ˜ σ∗
i generates the same probability distribution over the equivalence classes as does the
original strategy, σ∗
i .
Second, we construct the agent’s strategy in the menu delegation game. Here, care needs to be
taken for two reasons. First, various distinct messages in Mi may generate the same distribution
over Di in the original communication game. This can easily be addressed by integrating the prob-
ability mass on a given menu choice induced by the distribution over messages. A second problem
arises because a principal may choose a mixed strategy over two distinct communication mecha-
nisms from the same equivalence class (i.e., {πi,Mi} and {πi0,Mi} where πi(·|Mi) = πi0
(·|Mi)),
but where the realization of this mixture aﬀects the agent’s equilibrium choice over messages and
the resulting distribution over allocations. Technically, this arises if the equilibrium has the agent
using the principal’s choice among strategically equivalent contracts as a randomizing device for
communication. Reducing the principal’s strategy space to menu oﬀers eliminates this randomiza-
tion device, but this loss can be addressed by building the corresponding randomization directly
into the agent’s menu-selection strategy. To this end, we need to preserve the agent’s randomiza-
tion over payoﬀ relevant lotteries from the original game. The following construction of the agent’s

























i (πi) > 0 and τ(d) = π(d|m) ∀ d ∈ D
)
.
15The term in parenthesis is the equilibrium probability distribution of π from the original commu-
nication game, conditional on T; it is used to calculate the agent’s average randomization over
strategically distinct choices from a given menu T, thereby preserving whatever mixture existed
over available payoﬀ-relevant decisions in the original game. Oﬀ the equilibrium path (i.e., for
Ψ(τ) = ∅), we can assign ˜ σ∗
0(τ|θ,T) = σ∗
0(m|θ,π) for some (π,m) such that τ ∈ πi(·|Mi) and
τ(d) = π(d|m) for all d ∈ D. Because τ ∈ π(·|M) for some mechanism, π, such a pair (π,m) exists.
We now demonstrate that these new strategies comprise an equilibrium in the menu game.
First, consider a deviation by the agent from the proposed equilibrium. Suppose that there exists








Since τ0 ∈ T, there exists a π which is oﬀered in the equilibrium of the original communication
game such that τ0 ∈ π(·|M), and there exists an unsent message m0 ∈ M0 such that τ0(d) ≡ π(d|m0)
for all d ∈ D. Substituting into the above inequality, we immediately obtain a contradiction with
σ∗
0(m0|θ,π) = 0 as the original strategies do not comprise an equilibrium in the communication
game.
Next, consider a deviation by some principal, i. Suppose that Ti0 is a strictly preferred oﬀer.
Because Ti0 ∈ T i(Mi), by our assumption of consistency between menus and message spaces, there
exists a πi0 ∈ Πi(Mi) such that Ti0 = πi0(·|Mi). Moreover, all elements of this set are unsent in
the original equilibrium given that Ti0 is unsent in the candidate equilibrium. But if Ti0 yields
a higher expected payoﬀ to principal i in the menu-delegation game, then so too must πi0 ∈ Πi
in the communication game, which implies the original strategies were not an equilibrium in the
communication game. Hence, ˜ σ∗ is an equilibrium to the delegation game.
Lastly, we establish the payoﬀ equivalence between the equilibrium of the communication game















































which is the equilibrium allocation in the delegation game, µ˜ σ∗(d|θ). 2
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